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In this paper a framework for developing a coherent
theory of mathematics and physics together is de-
scribed. The main and possibly dening character-
istic of such a theory is discussed: the theory must
maximally describe its own validity and complete-
ness, and must be maximally valid and complete.
Denitions of validity and completeness are based on
those used in mathematical logic. A coherent theory
is universally applicable, so its domain includes intel-
ligent physical systems that test the validity of the
theory. Anthropic aspects of a coherent theory are
discussed. It is suggested that the basic properties of
the physical universe are entwined with and emerge
from such a theory. It is even possible that the con-
dition that there exists a coherent theory satisfying
the maximal validity and completeness requirement
is so restrictive that there is just one theory and one
physical universe satisfying the theory. Other aspects
include the proof that the meaning content of a co-
herent theory (or any axiomatizable theory) is inde-
pendent of the information content of the theory. The
observation that language is physical is discussed. All
symbols and words of any language necessarily have
physical representations as states of physical systems
that are in the domain of a coherent theory. This
is an important property not enjoyed by any purely
mathematical theory. An example of a physical rep-
resentation of language is described in the appendix.
1 Introduction
It is perhaps obvious that there is a very close re-
lationship between physics and mathematics. That
theoretical physics is essentially mathematical in na-
ture can be seen by a cursory examination of most
any book on theoretical physics. Also theoretical
physics is used to generate predictions that can be
armed or refuted by experiment. Often these pre-
dictions are generated as outcomes of complex com-
putations. If these outcomes are numbers then they
are compared with the numerical outcomes of rele-
vant experiments. The validity of a physical theory
is based on many such comparisons between theory
and experiment. Agreement constitutes support for
the theory. Disagreement between theoretical predic-
tions and experiment erodes support for the theory
and, for crucial experiments, may result in the theory
being abandoned.
Yet it also seems that there is a disconnect between
physics and mathematics. One way to see the prob-
lem is to note that, from a foundational point of view,
physics takes mathematics for granted. In many ways
theoretical physics treats mathematics much like a
warehouse of dierent consistent axiom systems each
with their set of theorems. If a system needed by
physics has been studied, it is taken from the ware-
house, existing theorems and results are used, and,
if needed, new theorems are proved. If theoretical
physics needs a system which has not been invented,
it is created as a new system. Then the needed the-
orems are proved based on the axioms of the new
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system.
The problem here is that physics and mathemat-
ics are considered as separate disciplines. The pos-
sibility that they might be part of a larger coherent
theory of mathematics and physics together is not
much discussed. For example basic aspects such as
truth, validity, consistency, and provability are de-
scribed in detail in mathematical logic which is the
study of axiom systems and their models [1]. The
possibility that how these concepts are described or
dened may aect their use in physics, and may also
even influence what is true in physics at a very basic
level has not been considered. (A very preliminary
attempt to see how these concepts might be used in
quantum mechanics is made in [2].)
The situation in mathematics is dierent. Here
the problem is that most work in mathematics and
mathematical logic is purely abstract with little at-
tention paid to foundational aspects of physics. The
facts that mathematical reasoning is carried out by
physical systems subject to physical laws, and sym-
bols, words, and formulas in any language, formal or
not, are physical systems in dierent states, is, for
the most part, ignored. In some ways the various
constructivist interpretations of mathematics, rang-
ing from extreme intuitionism [3] to more moderate
views [4, 5] (see also [6]) do acknowledge this prob-
lem.
However most mathematicians and physicists ig-
nore any limitations imposed by constructivist view-
points. Their activities appear to be based implicitly
on the ideal or Platonic viewpoint of mathematical
existence, i.e. that mathematical entities and state-
ments have an ideal existence and truth status inde-
pendent of any physical limitations [7] or an observers
knowledge of them [8, 9]. The "luscious jungle flora"
[6] aspect of this view of mathematical existence com-
pared to the more ascetic landscape [6] of more con-
structivist views is hard to resist.
However, this viewpoint has the problem that one
must face the existence of two types of objects. There
are the ideal mathematical objects that exist outside
space-time and the physical objects that exist inside
of and influence the properties of space-time. The
existence of two types of objects that appear to be
unrelated yet are also closely related is quite unsat-
isfactory.
Another approach to mathematics is that of the
formalist school [8, 9], Here mathematics is consid-
ered to be in essence like a game in which symbol
strings (statements or formulas) are manipulated ac-
cording to well dened rules. The goal is the rigorous
proof of theorems. Mathematical entities have no in-
dependent reality status or meaning.
In one sense the formalist school is related to
physics in that provability and computability are
closely related. In work on computability and com-
putational complexity [10, 11] it is clearly realized
that computability is related closely to what can be
carried out (in an ideal sense) on a physical com-
puter. Yet, as has been noted [12], the exact nature
of the relationship between computations carried out
by real physical computers and abstract ideal com-
puters, such as Turing machines, is not clear.
The influence of physics on mathematics is perhaps
most apparent in recent work on quantum informa-
tion theory and quantum computing. Here it has
been shown [13, 14] that there exist problems that
can in principle be solved more eciently on a quan-
tum computer than by any known classical compu-
tational algorithm. Also the increased eciency of
simulation of physical quantum systems on quantum
computers [15, 16, 17, 18] compared to simulation on
classical systems is relevant to these considerations.
The problems on the relationship between physics
and mathematics have been considered by others.
In his insistence that "Information is Physical" Lan-
dauer [19] also recognizes the importance of this rela-
tionship. His reference to the fact that, according to
Bridgman, mathematics should be conned to what
are in essence programmable sequences of operations,
or that mathematics is empirical [20], supports this
viewpoint. Similar views on the need for an opera-
tional characterization of physical and set theoretic
entities has been expressed [21].
Other attempts to show the importance of physics
on the foundations of mathematics include work on
randomness [22] and on quantum set theory [23, 24]
(see also [25]). Recent work on the relationship be-
tween the Riemann hypothesis and aspects of quan-
tum mechanics [26, 27] and relativity [28], and eorts
to connect quantum mechanics and quantum com-
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puting with logic, languages, and dierent aspects of
physics should be noted [29, 30, 31, 32] along with
eorts to connect mathematical logic with physics
[33, 34, 35].
In spite of this progress both the lack of and a need
for a coherent theory of mathematics and physics to-
gether remain. One view of this is expressed by the
title of a paper by Wigner [36] "On the unreasonable
eectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences".
One does not know why mathematics is so eective
and an explanation is needed. Even though the pa-
per was published in 1960, it is still relevant today.
A related question, "Why is the physical world so
comprehensible?" [37] also needs to be answered.
The purpose of this paper is to examine in more de-
tail some aspects of the relationship between physics
and mathematics. The goal is to work towards the
development of a coherent theory of mathematics and
physics. In particular the main (and possibly den-
ing) characteristic of such a theory is proposed and
discussed. This is that the theory should maximally
describe its own validity and completeness, and it
should be maximally valid and complete. It is also
possible that this condition is so restrictive that there
is only one theory that satises this condition. Fur-
thermore, it may also be the case that the uniqueness
of the theory implies that there is only one physical
universe that satises the theory.
These ideas will be discussed in the following sec-
tions. The approach suggested here is to work to-
wards a coherent theory of mathematics and physics
by combining mathematical logical concepts with
quantum mechanics or some suitable generalization
such as quantum eld theory. As such the purpose of
this paper is to provide a background or framework
of ideas which will guide future work on the construc-
tion of a coherent theory of mathematics and physics.
Since mathematical logic deals with axiomatizable
theories based on formal languages and their mod-
els, theories described here will also be considered
as formal axiomatic systems. This does not mean
that physics and mathematics should adopt formal
methods in the proofs and derivations of new results
and theorems. The reason for taking this approach is
that semantic and syntactic aspects or theories and
their interpretations are clearly separated. Also the
distinction between the domain of discourse of the
theory and metatheoretical aspects is made clear.
It should be noted that there are many axiomati-
zations of physical theories in the literature. In par-
ticular axiomatizations of quantum mechanics and
quantum eld theory have been much studied. These
include algebraic approaches [38, 39], quantum logic
approaches [40, 41] and others [42]. These axiom-
atizations which are often quite mathematical and
rigorous, could be axiomatized in the formal sense
discussed here. However, in common with most ax-
iomatizations of mathematical and physical theories,
this is not done as it is not necessary for the purposes
of the studies.
2 A Coherent Theory of Math-
ematics and Physics
The basic idea is that a coherent theory of mathe-
matics and physics includes a coherent description of
both the mathematical and physical components of
the universe. The theory must also satisfy a basic and
possibly dening requirement. That is, the coherent
theory must be able to maximally describe its own
validity and completeness and it must be maximally
valid and complete.
If quantum mechanics, or some suitable general-
ization such as quantum eld theory, is taken as the
physical component, then a coherent theory of math-
ematics and quantum mechanics must satisfy the ba-
sic requirement. It must maximally describe its own
validity and completeness and it must be maximally
valid and complete.
2.1 Validity and Completeness in the
Requirement
It is expected that the denitions of validity and com-
pleteness for the coherent theory will be similar to
those used in mathematical logic [43, 1]. A formal
theory is valid if all formulas or expressions in the
language of the theory that are theorems are true.
The theory is complete if for each closed formula (an
expression with no free variables) either it or its nega-
tion, but not both, is a theorem. Group theory, the
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theory of real numbers, and nonatomic Boolean al-
gebra are examples of complete theories. As shown
by Go¨del [44] there are also incomplete theories. Ex-
amples include arithmetic, set theory, and any other
theory that includes arithmetic.
Here the denitions of validity and completeness
must take into account that one is dealing with a
theory that includes both mathematics and physics.
An informal denition of validity is that the theory
is valid if each property of a physical system in the
domain of the theory, that is predicted by the theory
and is capable of experimental verication or refuta-
tion, is in fact veried by experiment.
The denition of validity says that for each phys-
ical property of a system, if there is a theorem of
the theory stating that the system has the property,
then it must be true, provided it can be experimen-
tally veried. It follows from this1 that a theory is
valid if it makes no predictions at all. Less extreme
cases are included in which a theory makes very few
predictions, which must be true.
These possibilities can be removed by requiring
that the theory be maximally complete. Here one
follows mathematical logic by dening a coherent the-
ory to be complete if for each property of a physical
system in the theory domain, either it or its nega-
tion, but not both, is predicted by the theory and is
capable of experimental test.
As is well known, quantum mechanics is not com-
plete in this sense. For instance if one assumes that
single measurements of observables on quantum sys-
tems are properties of physical systems, then incom-
pleteness follows from the predictability of expecta-
tion values only of observables; individual measure-
ment outcomes are not predictable. Also there may
well be other complex properties, including those that
are self referential and similar to those used by Go¨del
in his proof of the rst incompleteness theorem [44],
that cannot be predicted or measured. This is the
reason for the qualication of maximal for validity
and completeness in the requirement for the coher-
ent theory of mathematics and physics.
In the denitions of validity and completeness,
1This is based on the logic of if-then statements which are
true if the ”if” part is false.
physical procedures enter in two places: the deter-
mining of which statements are theorems and thus
are testable physical properties, and validity testing
of these predictable properties. For theorems physi-
cal procedures are important to the extent that the-
orem proving can be implemented on a real physical
computer. Methods for implementing this are based
on the arithmetization of proofs by use of Go¨del maps
and the requirement that arithmetic and other oper-
ations can be implemented on a physical computer.
For physical theories, and a coherent theory of
physics and mathematics, physical procedures also
enter with the validity requirement that there ex-
ists an experimental test for any predictable prop-
erty. This creates a problem in that predictability of
a property for a physical system does not guarantee
that there exists a physical procedure for determining
whether the system has or does not have the prop-
erty.
The problem here is that there is no way so far to
dene physical implementability for procedures. This
includes procedures for preparing systems in dierent
quantum states and procedures for measuring observ-
ables, represented by self adjoint operators in an al-
gebra of operators. It is clear that for many states
of complex quantum systems and for many observ-
ables it is very unlikely that there exist eciently
implementable physical procedures for preparing the
states and measuring the observables.
Examples of these states include complex entan-
gled states of multicomponent systems of the type
studied by Bennett et al [45]. Examples of observ-
ables include projection operators on these entangled
states. A related example is based on the observation
that ecient physical implementability is not pre-
served under arbitrary unitary transformations of self
adoint operators [46]. Thus if the observable O is ef-
ciently implementable it does not follow that U OU y
is implementable for arbitrary unitary U . It has also
been noted that there is a problem in determining
exactly which logical procedures or algorithms are
physically implementable [12]. This problem is espe-
cially relevant for quantum computer algorithms as
it is not at all clear which are eciently physically
implementable and which are not.
The requirement that a theory maximally describe
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its own validity and completeness means that there
are one or more formulas in the language of the co-
herent theory that can be interpreted to mean that
the theory is maximally valid and complete. These
formulas are likely to be very complex as they must
somehow express the concepts of truth and provabil-
ity for the theory. As such these formulas may not
be theorems of the theory.
To see why, it is easier to consider an alternate form
of the requirement. This is that the coherent the-
ory of mathematics and quantum mechanics must be
maximally self consistent. That is, the theory must
refer to its own consistency as much as is possible and
it must be consistent.
The usefulness of this form of the requirement is
based on the properties of consistency. An axiom
system is dened to be consistent if not all formulas
are theorems, or, equivalently, if it has a model. A
model is a universe of objects, relations, and func-
tions, etc., in which relations are either true or false
and the various symbols and formulas of the theory
obtain meaning through their interpretation as ob-
jects or relations in the model.
These denitions show the importance of consis-
tency as inconsistent axiom systems are useless in
that any formula, as a statement in the language on
which the axiom system is based, is a theorem. Also
all formulas based on an inconsistent axiom system
are meaningless as they have no interpretation in a
model.
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem [1, 43, 44]
is directly applicable to the problem at hand because
it says that if a theory is consistent and is strong
enough to express consistency of the theory, then the
formula expressing consistency is not a theorem of the
theory. Also the theorem applies to any extension
of the theory in which the formula expressing the
consistence of the original theory is provable.
Based on this, any formula in the language of the
coherent theory of physics and mathematics that ex-
presses the consistency of the theory is probably not
a theorem of the theory. It is also likely to be the
case that any formula expressing the validity and
completeness of the theory is also not a theorem of
the theory. However the lack of theoremhood for
these formulas are not theorems says nothing about
whether they are true or false. This is taken care of
by the second part of the requirement; namely, that
a coherent theory be maximally valid and complete.
This part includes the requirement that the formu-
las expressing the validity and completeness of the
coherent theory are true.
So far the requirement has been expressed in two
forms, one using consistency and the other using va-
lidity and completeness. At present it is not clear
which form is preferable. It is suspected, based on
a very simple model [2, 47], that the form expressed
using validity and completeness is stronger. For this
reason the form of the requirement, as originally
stated in terms of validity and completeness, will be
used in the rest of the paper.
2.2 Universal Applicability
Another property that a coherent theory of mathe-
matics and physics should have is that it is univer-
sally applicable. This includes both the physical and
mathematical components of the theory. Since quan-
tum mechanics or some generalization is, at present,
the physical theory assumed to be universally appli-
cable, it is expected that a coherent theory of mathe-
matics and physics is a coherent theory of mathemat-
ics and quantum mechanics that maximally describes
its own validity and completeness and must be max-
imally valid and complete.
Universal applicability of the mathematical com-
ponent is taken into account by including mathemat-
ical logical concepts with quantum mechanics. Since
mathematical logic includes the study of mathemat-
ical systems as axiomatizable systems and their in-
terpretations, universal applicability means that all
the mathematical systems used in quantum mechan-
ics and its extensions that are in use or may be used in
the future are included. Also included are basic prop-
erties of physical and mathematical theories, such as
truth, validity, completeness, consistency, and prov-
ability, that are treated in mathematical logic. A
coherent theory would be expected to combine these
concepts with quantum mechanics.
At this point it is not clear how to exactly de-
ne universal applicability for the physical compo-
nent of the theory, or whether one should even sepa-
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rate the theory into mathematical and physical com-
ponents. In the case of quantum mechanics, one view
[48] is that dening universal applicability to include
all physical systems means that one must accept the
Everett interpretation [49, 50] of quantum mechanics.
This interpretation assumes that the whole universe
is described by a quantum state evolving according
to quantum dynamical laws.
One way to avoid this may be to assume that uni-
versal applicability means that the theory is applica-
ble only to systems that are subsystems or part of
other larger systems that are in turn subsystems of
other still larger systems.2 This includes both open
and closed subsystems including those that may be
isolated for a period of time.
The exact denition is probably best left to further
development of a coherent theory. However the de-
nition should be such to include subsystems described
by a nite number of degrees of freedom and many
systems, such as quantum elds, that are described
by an innite number of degrees of freedom.
Based on this condition, universal applicability
supports the requirement that the coherent theory
maximally describe its own validity and complete-
ness. To see this one notes that validation of a physi-
cal theory includes the comparison of theoretical pre-
dictions with the results of experiment. In general the
theoretical calculations and predictions are made by
computers and experiments are carried out by robots
or intelligent systems using dierent pieces of equip-
ment. The validation process is carried out by in-
telligent systems. If the coherent theory is univer-
sally applicable then the dynamics of the computers,
robots, experimental equipment, and intelligent sys-
tems carrying out the validation must be described
by the physical dynamical laws of the theory.
The importance of the requirement of universal ap-
plicability is that the properties and dynamics of the
systems implementing the validation of the theory are
2A more precise statement of this might be: (1) If the theory
is applicable to subsystem A, then there exist many subsystems
B that contain A and to which the theory is applicable. (2)
There are many subsystems A to which the theory is applica-
ble. Furthermore the definition of ”many subsystems” must be
sufficiently broad to include all subsystems accessible to state
preparation and experiment.
included in the domain of applicability of the theory
to the maximum extent possible. In the case of quan-
tum mechanics or some suitable generalization this
means that computers and robots are quantum me-
chanical systems with dynamics described by quan-
tum dynamical laws. This holds for both microscopic
systems, such as quantum computers and quantum
robots [51] and macroscopic systems such as classical
computers and robots which are in very wide use at
present.
It also follows that intelligent systems are quan-
tum mechanical systems. The observation that the
only known examples (including the readers of this
paper) of intelligent systems are macroscopic, with
about 1025 degrees of freedom, does not contradict
the quantum mechanical nature of these systems.
This may be a reflection of the possibility that a nec-
essary requirement for a quantum system to be in-
telligent is that it is macroscopic. However, whether
this is or is not the case, is not known at present.
That intelligent observers are both conscious self
aware systems and quantum systems has been the
basis for much discussion on consciousness in quan-
tum mechanics [7, 52, 53, 54]. Included are discus-
sions on interactions between two quantum observers
[55, 56]. These avenues will not be pursued here as
they do not seem to be the best way to progress to-
wards developing a coherent theory of mathematics
and physics.
It follows that the dynamics of the quantum sys-
tems carrying out the validation of quantum mechan-
ics must be described by quantum dynamical laws.
Thus quantum mechanics must be able to describe
the dynamics of its own validation process. How-
ever validation of a theory involves more than just
describing the dynamics of the systems carrying out
the validation. Validation includes the association
of meaning to the results of theoretical derivations
and computations carried out by quantum systems
(as computers). Meaning must also be associated to
the results of carrying out experiments by quantum
systems (as robots or intelligent systems).
This association of meaning to the results of quan-
tum processes is essential. It is basic to determining
which processes constitute valid procedures, either
computational or experimental. These processes are
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a very small fraction of the totality of all processes
that can be carried out, most of which have no mean-
ing at all. They are neither computations or experi-
ments.
This association of meaning includes such essen-
tials as the (nontrivial) assignment of numbers to the
results of both computational and experimental pro-
cess. A computation process or an experiment that
halts produces a complex physical system in a par-
ticular physical state. What numbers, if any that
are associated to the states depend on the meaning
and validity of the process [57, 58]. That is the pro-
cess must be a valid computational or experimental
procedure. If it is valid then one must know the prop-
erty to which it refers. This is needed to know the
association between theoretical computations and ex-
perimental procedures.
For example in quantum mechanics for some ob-
servable O and state Ψ one must be able to deter-
mine which of the valid computation procedures is a
computation of the expectation value hΨjOjΨi. One
must also know which of the valid experimental pro-
cedures corresponds to a measurement of this expec-
tation value. As is well known the experiment must
in general be repeated may times to generate the ex-
pectation value as a limit as n !1 of the average of
the rst n repetitions of the experiment. Association
of meaning to these procedures also includes all the
components involved in determining that appropriate
limits exist for both the computation procedures and
experimental procedures.
A coherent theory of mathematics and quantum
mechanics must be able to express as much of this
meaning as is possible. Thus not only must it be
able to express the dynamics of its own validation,
but it must be able to express the meaning associa-
tions described above to the maximum extent possi-
ble. Thus it must be able to maximally describe its
own validation.
A similar argument applies to maximal complete-
ness. That is, there must be a sense in which a coher-
ent theory includes all properties that are predictable
and capable of experimental test. Of course the prob-
lem here lies in the exact meaning of "all properties
that    ". One may hope and expect that a coherent
theory would be able to express to the maximum ex-
tent possible the meaning of "all properties that    ".
And it should also be able to express the condition
that it is also maximally complete.
The possibility that there may be no single theory
that is maximally complete should also be considered.
Instead there may be a nonterminating sequence of
theories of increasing completeness. This possibility
will be discussed more later on.
These arguments form the basis for the require-
ment that the coherent theory maximally describe
its own validation and completeness. However, being
able to generate such a description does not guaran-
tee that the coherent theory is valid and complete.
A theory may be interpreted to express that it has
some property, but it does not follow that it actually
has that property. This possibility is excluded for the
coherent theory by also requiring that it is maximally
valid and complete.
2.3 The Coherent Theory and the
Strong Anthropic Principle
The conditions that a coherent theory include both
physics and mathematics and that it satisfy the re-
quirement of maximal description of its validity and
completeness and be maximally valid and complete,
suggest that there may be a very close relation be-
tween the theory and the basic properties of the phys-
ical universe. It may be the case that at a very basic
level the basic properties of the physical universe are
entwined with and may even be determined by a co-
herent theory that satises the requirements.
Examples of such basic properties that may emerge
from or be determined by the coherent theory in-
clude such aspects as the reason for three space and
one time dimension (See Tegmark [33] for another
viewpoint), the strengths and reason for existence of
the four basic forces, why quantum mechanics is the
valid physical theory, etc.. Even if few or none of
these properties are determined, one may hope that
the theory will shed new light on already explained
basic properties.
These possibilities suggest that a coherent theory
with the requirement is related to the strong an-
thropic principle [59, 60, 61]. This principle can be
stated in dierent ways. One statement is that "The
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basic properties of the universe must be such that [in-
telligent]life can develop" [59]. Wheeler’s interpreta-
tion as quoted by Barrow and Tipler [59] is that "Ob-
servers are necessary to bring the universe into be-
ing". A stronger statement is the nal anthropic prin-
ciple [59] "Intelligent information processing must oc-
cur and never die out".
The relation between this principle and a coherent
theory can be seen by recasting the statement of the
maximal validity and completeness requirement into
an existence statement or condition: There exists a
coherent theory of physics and mathematics that max-
imally describes its own validity and completeness
and is maximally valid and complete. In this case
the basic properties of the physical universe emerge
from or are a consequence of the existence statement.
That is, the basic properties of the physical universe
must be such that the existence statement is true.
Another way to state this is that the basic prop-
erties of the physical universe must be such that a
coherent theory is creatable. Since intelligent beings
are necessary to create such a theory, it follows that
the basic properties of the physical universe must be
such as to make it possible for intelligent beings to ex-
ist. Since the intelligent beings, as physical systems,
are part of the physical universe, the theory must, in
some sense, also refer to its own creatability.
None of this implies that intelligent beings must
exist, only that it must be possible for them to exist.
Of course existence of intelligent beings is a necessary
condition for the actual creation of such a coherent
theory.
2.4 On the Possible Uniqueness of the
Coherent Theory
The requirement that a coherent theory of mathe-
matics and physics maximally describe its own va-
lidity and completeness and be maximally valid and
complete would seem to be quite restrictive. Indeed
one may speculate that the condition is so restrictive
that there is just one such theory.
One reason this might be the case is that if there
were several dierent coherent theories each satis-
fying the requirement, then there would be several
dierent physical universes, with the basic physical
properties of each universe determined by one of the
theories. Yet we are aware of just one physical uni-
verse, the one we inhabit, with the basic properties
determined by both physical theory and experiment.
It follows that if the basic properties of the physical
universe are determined by a coherent theory satis-
fying the requirement, then the existence of just one
physical universe implies that there is just one coher-
ent theory satisfying the requirement. (Here coherent
theories that may dier in some manner but deter-
mine the same physical properties of a universe are
identied as one theory.)
Another aspect that may restrict the number of
acceptable coherent theories is the emphasis that the
theory maximally describe its own validity and com-
pleteness and that it is maximally valid and complete.
There may well be many coherent theories that partly
describe their own validity and completeness and are
partly valid and complete. If such theories exist, they
would be eliminated by the requirements of maximal
description of their own validity and completeness
and that they are maximally valid and complete.
Viewed from this uniqueness perspective, the basic
statement that there exists just one coherent theory
of physics and mathematics that maximally describes
its own validity and completeness and is maximally
valid and complete becomes a quite powerful axiom.
The reason is that it can be used with the arguments
given above to obtain the result that there is just one
physical universe with basic properties determined by
the unique theory. And this should be our universe.
If this line of reasoning is indeed valid, then it
would be very satisfying as it answers the question,
"Why does our physical universe have the properties
it does?". Answer: The physical universe could not
be otherwise as it is the only one whose properties
emerge from or are determined by the coherent the-
ory. No other universe is possible because there is
just one coherent theory satisfying the maximality
requirement and each such theory is associated with
just one physical universe.
At present this argument, although appealing,
must be regarded as speculation. Whether it is true
or not must await development of a coherent theory
of physics and mathematics, if such is even possible.
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2.5 Emergence of the Basic Proper-
ties of the Physical Universe
At present the main approach to physics seems to be
that one assumes implicitly a physical universe whose
basic properties exist independent of and a priori to
a theoretical description, supported by experiment,
of the universe. This is implied by reference to ex-
periments as "discovering properties of nature". A
priori, independent existence of the physical universe
is also implied in the expression used above "theo-
retical description, supported by experiment, of the
universe".
The approach to mathematics is much more vari-
able as there are many dierent interpretations of the
meaning of existence in mathematics [8, 9, 62]. How-
ever, the Platonic viewpoint that is widely accepted,
at least implicitly, is that mathematical objects exist
a priori to and independent of a theoretical descrip-
tion of them with their properties to be discovered
by mathematical research.
Here it is suggested that one should regard the ba-
sic properties of the physical and mathematical uni-
verses as very much entwined with a coherent theory
of mathematics and physics. Neither the mathemati-
cal universe, physical universe, nor the coherent the-
ory should be considered to be a priori and indepen-
dent of the other two components. The basic proper-
ties of all three components should be considered to
be emergent together and mutually determined.
This means that, for the relation between the phys-
ical universe and the coherent theory, the basic phys-
ical aspects of the physical universe should be consid-
ered to emerge from and be determined by the basic
properties of a coherent theory of physics and mathe-
matics. Also the basic properties of a coherent theory
should, in turn, emerge from and be determined by
the basic properties of the physical universe.
It must be strongly emphasized that the emergence
noted above does not mean that there is any arbi-
trariness to the basic physical properties and that an
observer can choose them as he pleases. Rather the
viewpoint taken here suggests that a coherent theory
that maximally describes its own validity and com-
pleteness and is maximally valid and complete, is also
maximally objective. The reason is that a maximally
self referential theory refers to as much of its own con-
sistency, validity, and completeness as is possible, and
the role of an observer or intelligent being is thereby
minimized in determining the basic properties of the
theory. In this case the basic properties of the uni-
verse as described by a coherent theory must appear
to any observer to be objective and real and maxi-
mally independent of the existence and activities of
an observer. That is what one means by objectivity.
In one sense the idea of the emergence of basic
physical properties of the universe is already in use.
This is based on the condition that the more fun-
damental properties of the physical universe require
many layers of theory supported by experiment to
give them meaning. Their reality status is more indi-
rect as it depends on many layers of theory supported
by experiment.
For example the existence and properties of atoms
is indirect in that it is based on all the experimental
support for the many theoretical predictions based
on the assumed existence and properties of atoms.
One does not directly observe individual atoms. Pic-
tures of individual atoms taken with an electron mi-
croscope depend on many layers of theory and exper-
iment to determine that a complex physical system is
an electron microscope and that the output patterns
of light and dark shown on lm or a screen are not
meaningless but have meaning as pictures of individ-
ual atoms.
The physical reality and properties of more funda-
mental systems, such as quarks and gluons, are even
more indirect than for atoms and depend on more in-
tervening layers of theory and experiment. The same
holds for neutrinos as fundamental systems whose re-
ality status and properties are quite indirect. Exper-
imental support for the existence of these particles
depends on the layers of theory, which may include
quantum electrodynamics, and all the supporting ex-
periments needed to describe the proper functioning
of large particle detectors and assigning meaning to
the output of the detectors.
A similar situation exists for large, far away ob-
jects such as quasars. The reality status and physical
properties of these systems are based on the theo-
ries of relativity and interactions of electromagnetic
elds, etc.. These are needed to interpret the ob-
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servations made using telescopes and to describe the
proper functioning of telescopes and other equipment
used.
On the other hand the reality status and some
properties of other physical systems require little or
no theoretical or experimental support. For example,
the existence and hardness of rocks or the existence
of the sun and the facts that it is hot, bright and
round, are directly observed properties. Little the-
ory with supporting experiment is needed to make
these observations. Other properties of these objects
are more indirect. An example is the description of
the sun as a gravitating body generating energy by
thermonuclear fusion of hydrogen.
It should be emphasized that none of the above im-
plies that systems such as quarks, atoms, and quasars
are any less real and objective than are rocks and the
sun. Rather the point is that the reality of their
existence and their properties are more indirect and
depends on more intervening layers of theory and ex-
periment than is the case for rocks and the sun. Also
the reality of all the properties of quarks, atoms and
quasars, is indirect in its dependence on layers of the-
ory and supporting experiment. For nearby moder-
ate sized objects some of the properties are quite di-
rect and some are more indirect. For example, as
noted above, direct properties of the sun are that it
is hot bright and round. Indirect properties include
the source of its energy.
It is necessary to emphasize the importance of the
intervening layers of theory and experiment needed to
support the proper functioning and interpretation of
complex equipment. Since most equipment involves
the electromagnetic interactions between systems or
between elds and systems, the theory of these in-
teractions must be well understood to ensure that a
given physical system is a properly functioning piece
of equipment. This is needed to to ensure that cer-
tain properties of the system represent output and
that the output has meaning.
3 Basic Mathematical Proper-
ties and a Coherent Theory
So far relatively little has been said about basic math-
ematical properties and how they might be entwined
with basic physical properties and a coherent theory
of mathematics and physics. Here by basic mathe-
matical properties is meant those properties common
to all theories, mathematical and physical, that are
discussed in mathematical logic. This includes the
properties of truth, validity, consistency, complete-
ness, and provability and the condition that all theo-
ries are considered to be axiomatizable systems where
the axioms are designated expressions in some lan-
guage suitable for expressing the various statements
of the theory.
Another basic property, discussed explicitly in
mathematical logic, is the distinction between syn-
tactical and semantic aspects of a theory [1]. Syn-
tactic aspects are the purely formal aspects of a lan-
guage and its expressions. Included are denitions
of dierent symbols as variables, constants, function
and relation symbols of a language, and denitions of
symbol strings as terms and formulas or statements
in the language. Also provability, completeness, and
consistency have syntactical denitions.
Semantic aspects of a theory are those associated
with the meaning given to the symbols and expres-
sions of a language through interpretations or maps of
the symbols and expressions to informal or intuitive
model universes. Truth is taken to be an informal
intuitive concept, and validity is dened relative to
this concept.
These two aspects must be connected, and part of
mathematical logic is concerned with theorems that
relate syntactic and semantic aspects of an axiomati-
zable theory [1, 62]. Included is Go¨dels completeness
theorem for rst order logic. This theorem says that
a formula is a theorem of the theory if and only if it is
valid (i.e. true in all models of the theory)3. Another
theorem states that an axiom system is consistent if
and only if it has a model.
Entwining of these properties with those of a coher-
3A model of a theory is a universe of objects in which the
axioms of the theory are true.
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ent theory of mathematics and physics results from
the assumption that, in common with other theories,
the statements of a coherent theory are expressible
in some language with some of the statements cor-
responding to axioms of the theory. If the theory is
only partially axiomatizable or is not axiomatizable,
then this should be discovered in future work towards
developing such a theory.
A coherent theory is dierent from purely mathe-
matical theories in that models include physical uni-
verses. Since it is assumed here that the theory is ax-
iomatizable in rst order logic, the various theorems
relating syntactic and semantic properties would be
expected to hold. In particular Go¨del’s completeness
theorem relates the notion of provability or theorem-
hood to physical truth. That is, a coherent theory is
valid if all predictable properties of physical systems,
as theorems of the coherent theory, are true, at least
in the universe we inhabit and in any others, if they
exist [63, 33].
Another property that is important for a coher-
ent theory, and for other mathematical and physical
theories is the condition that it must be physically
possible to make theoretical predictions. The truth
of this property, which is taken for granted, is sup-
ported by the wide use of computers in mathemat-
ics and physics to make computations whose results
(numerical and otherwise) are used as predictions of
physical or mathematical properties.
Yet this fact is quite nontrivial and involves many
assumptions. Included is the requirement that there
exist physical states of systems that represent num-
bers. As discussed elsewhere in detail [57, 58, 46],
the meaning of this for natural numbers is that there
exist physical systems with states on which the basic
arithmetic operations, with properties determined by
the axioms or arithmetic or number theory, are e-
ciently physically implementable. Similar conditions
were described for the other types of numbers, the in-
tegers and rational numbers. Although the emphasis
of the discussion was for microscopic or quantum sys-
tems, the discussion holds also for macroscopic sys-
tems.
The importance of this is that if it were not pos-
sible to represent numbers by states of physical sys-
tems, then computers would not exist and it would
be impossible to carry out computations. Predic-
tions of properties, other than the most elementary
and direct, would not be possible as there would ex-
ist no means to calculate or determine the property.
Physics would not exist and it is doubtful that intel-
ligent systems would exist as they can also carry out
computations and make predictions.
These arguments show explicitly the interrela-
tionship between basic mathematical properties and
physical systems. Axioms of basic theories of dier-
ent types of numbers are used as part of the condi-
tions that must be satised so that physical systems
admit states representing numbers. Also since a co-
herent theory of physics and mathematics is assumed
to be axiomatizable, the well developed mathematical
logical theorems and properties of this type of theory
should apply.
4 Language is Physical
Another important aspect is based on the observa-
tion that the coherent theory, or any theory, must be
expressed in some language. All languages in exis-
tence, formal or informal, such as English, have the
property that they are based on the combination of
symbols into strings of symbols or expressions. For
the discussion here it is immaterial whether a symbol
string is or is not also a string of words.
The point to note is that all symbols of a language
are necessarily represented by physical systems in dif-
ferent states where the dierent states correspond to
dierent symbols. This is the case for printed text, or
for modulated waves moving through some medium
as is the case for spoken language, or for language
transmitted optically by use of photons.
As an example of this representation, consider the
text of this paper. Each letter, word, paragraph, etc.
is represented by physical systems in dierent phys-
ical states. This is the case whether the paper ap-
pears as printed material on pages of paper, patterns
of light and dark regions on a computer screen, or
as time variations in phase and amplitude of sound
waves as when one speaks or delivers a lecture. It also
applies if the paper is represented as a large tensor
product state of quantum systems where each letter
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of the language is represented by a state of a compo-
nent quantum system in the tensor product.
Additional details of a representation of language
text in terms of the arrangements of ink molecules
located on a 3 dimensional lattice of potential wells
are described in the Appendix. This representation
is just one of many possible. Others could be based
on spin projection states of systems. More generally,
one can use any physical observable with a discrete
spectrum and eigenstates that can be associated with
the language symbols. Also it must be possible to ac-
tually physically prepare systems in these eigenstates
and to measure the properties of these systems corre-
sponding to dierent properties of the language text.
This is similar to the k − ary representation of
numbers in quantum computation as tensor products
of individual qukit states. In many physical models
these tensor product states are represented by corre-
sponding tensor product states of composite quantum
systems. Each component state in the tensor product
may also correspond to an entangled state of several
quantum systems.4 Examples of this are shown by
various quantum error correcting codes [64].
The importance of this aspect is emphasized by the
observation that, if it were not possible to represent
language by states of physical systems, it would not
be possible to communicate or acquire knowledge, or
even think. It is an essential part of the existence of
intelligent observers, as language is an essential part
of the communication of information.
The basic requirement that language is physical
is a dierent way to express Landauer’s point that
information is physical [19]. It has the advantage
that for formal languages one can relate the various
mathematical logical properties of these languages
and their interpretations to their physical representa-
tions. It also clearly separates the concept of mean-
4One can also construct representations of numbers in
which there is no correspondence between the tensor product
representation of qukits and the states representing numbers.
An example of this using complex entangled states for k = 2
was shown in [46] for numbers < 2n with n arbitrary. A phys-
ical representation of numbers with entangled state structure
representing that in the example is very unlikely to exist. The
reason is that a necessary condition that states of quantum sys-
tems represent numbers is that the basic arithmetic operations
be efficiently physically implementable [57, 58, 46].
ing of the language from the information content of
the language. That is, the representation of language
or information by states of physical systems is quite
independent of whether the language or information
has any meaning and, if so, what the meaning is.
One way to prove this independence is to note that
for any axiomatizable theory there exists a computer
program of nite length that can generate all the ax-
ioms of the theory. This is based on the decidability
for any formula whether it is or is not an axiom of
the theory. It follows from this that there exists a
computer program of nite length that can enumer-
ate all the theorems of the theory even though as is
well known it is not decidable if a formula is or is not
a theorem. Based on this the information content of
an axiomatizable theory is dened to be the length of
the shortest computer program that can enumerate
the theorems of the theory [10].
Assume the theory is consistent. Then the formu-
las of the theory have meaning in that there exists a
model of the theory in which the formulas have mean-
ing and are true or false, based on their interpretation
in the model. In particular the theorems are true.
Now create a new theory by adding a new axiom
which is the negation of one of the original axioms.
The information content (in the sense of the shortest
program required to generate the theorems) of the
new theory is only slightly increased over that of the
original theory as the new axiom is a copy of one of
the original axioms with a negation symbol added.
However the extended set of axioms is inconsistent
so the new theory has no meaning in that it has no
model that satises the axioms. As a result all the
formulas and theorems of the extended theory are
meaningless.
It follows that two theories exist that have essen-
tially the same information content but are radically
dierent regarding their meaning. One has meaning
and the other does not.
Another interesting aspect of a coherent theory of
mathematics and physics that relates to the condi-
tion that language is physical, depends in part on the
signicance of Go¨del maps. These maps play an es-
sential role in the proofs of the Go¨del incompleteness
theorems for arithmetic and for any theory contain-
ing arithmetic [44, 43].
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The proof of Go¨del’s rst incompleteness theorem
is based on the construction of an arithmetic sen-
tence (a formula with no free variables) that can be
interpreted to express its own unprovability. If the
formula is false, then, since arithmetic is consistent,
the formula cannot be a theorem as no false formula
is a theorem in consistent theories. So it must be
true. But then it is unprovable and is not a theorem.
The negation of the formula is also not a theorem as
it is false.
In arithmetic Go¨del maps are used to construct an
arithmetic sentence referring to its own unprovability.
In essence a Go¨del map is a map from the symbols,
words, and expressions of the language of a theory to
the elements of a model universe or domain of appli-
cability of the theory. It enables any observer who
knows the map to interpret formulas of the theory as
referring to their metatheoretical properties. These
are properties that are outside the domain of applica-
bility of the theory. Typically they characterize the
dierent types of expressions, such as whether or not
expressions are variables, terms, formulas, sentences,
axioms, proofs, etc.. But any metaproperty that can
be described by a formula of the language by means
of a Go¨del map is included.
For arithmetic there are many examples of dier-
ent Go¨del maps in the literature. An especially trans-
parent one was suggested by Quine [65]. (See [43] for
a description.) To generate the map add one extra
symbol to the alphabet to stand for a spacer. Then all
expressions in the language consist of words and word
sequences separated by one or more spacer symbols.
If the extended alphabet has n+1 symbols, then the
map assigns the numbers 0, 1,    , n to the symbols.5
The map is extended to all expressions by letting each
expression correspond to a number in the base n+1,
that uses the assignment of numbers to symbols.
A specic example in the literature uses 12 alpha-
bet symbols and a spacer for arithmetic [43]. Then
each expression corresponds to a 13− ary represen-
tation of a number. For ordinary English, including
the ten numerals and a spacer symbol but exclud-
ing punctuation marks, each expression as a string of
words would correspond to a 37− ary representation
5These numbers are represented by n+1 numerals or digits.
of a number.
These maps can be used in arithmetic to show that
there are arithmetic or number theoretic formulas
that can be interpreted to express all the metathe-
oretic properties used in the denition of provability
or theoremhood for a formula. These formulas can
be used to construct an arithmetic formula, which is
just a statement of some property of numbers, that
can be interpreted to say that the nth formula in the
Go¨del numbering is not a theorem. This formula is
used along with some additional steps to construct
an arithmetic formula that expresses its own unprov-
ability, which is needed for the proof.
The reason for this somewhat detailed diversion
into Go¨del maps is to emphasize the fact that for
mathematical theories, such as arithmetic, the for-
mulas are about numbers, or other suitable math-
ematical objects in the universe of discourse of the
theory. Since the formulas themselves are not num-
bers or mathematical objects, none of their properties
can be expressed by the formulas of the theory. It is
the purpose of the Go¨del map to bridge this gap so
that formulas can be interpreted as numbers. How-
ever the choice of the Go¨del map, limited only by
some weak conditions that must be satised [43], is
arbitrary and is up to the observer. It is also com-
pletely external to and is not a part of the theory to
which it is being applied.
For theories such as a coherent theory of mathe-
matics and physics, that is universally applicable (see
Section 2.2 for a discussion), the situation is dier-
ent and rather interesting. In essence the point is
that any physical representation of a language with
its symbols, words, and expressions is necessarily in
the domain of applicability of a coherent theory of
mathematics and physics, or of any theory that is ap-
plicable to all physical systems. Since a physical rep-
resentation is an essential component of a language,
it follows that a coherent theory must describe the
physics of any systems whose states represent the lan-
guage and formulas of the theory.
It is to be emphasized that the formulas of a co-
herent theory that is universally applicable, or of any
physical theory, describe the physics of systems in
their domain of applicability. They make no mention
of which states of which physical systems in the do-
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main represent symbols and formulas in the language
of the theory.
However, each representation of symbols and for-
mulas of the language by states of some physical sys-
tems corresponds to a Go¨del map. This includes the
representation described in the Appendix. This is the
case because any 1−1 map from the symbols and for-
mulas of the theory language to states of physical sys-
tems in the theory domain enables anyone who knows
the map to interpret some formulas of the language
as describing properties of the language and theory
even though the formulas describe physical properties
of physical systems. Since there are many represen-
tations possible, and each representation corresponds
to a Go¨del map, there are many possible Go¨del maps.
But one must know which map is being used to in-
terpret specic states of physical systems as symbols
and formulas in the language of the theory.
This mirrors the usual situation of the well known
use of Go¨del maps in arithmetic. Formulas of the lan-
guage of arithmetic describe properties of numbers,
which are the mathematical systems in their domain
of applicability. They make no mention of proper-
ties of formulas or formula sequences of the language.
Go¨del maps enable anyone who knows the map to in-
terpret arithmetic formulas that describe properties
of numbers as describing properties of formulas and
formula sequences and other properties of the lan-
guage and theory of numbers. Since there are many
Go¨del maps, there are many interpretations possible.
The situation discussed here is dierent from the
well known use of classical or quantum computers to
represent numbers. In this case a representation is a
map from the natural numbers, integers, or rational
numbers, as elements of model universes for the corre-
sponding theories of these number types, to classical
or quantum states of physical systems [57, 58, 46].
Functions correspond to operations represented as
operators on the physical states of the systems. If
the functions are one-one the corresponding opera-
tors are unitary for quantum system states.
The map does not correspond to a Go¨del map that
maps all expressions of the language, including nu-
meral strings and others interpreted as functions and
relations, to physical states of physical systems. This
latter situation is the focus of this work, but for the-
ories encompassing both mathematics and physics.
The importance of these Go¨del maps for a coherent
theory of mathematics and physics that is universally
applicable should be noted. For mathematical theo-
ries, the condition that language is physical implies
the existence of physical representations of the sym-
bols, expressions, and sequences of expressions of the
language. However these representations do not cor-
respond to Go¨del maps because they are outside the
domain of applicability of the theory. These represen-
tations are not maps from expressions in the language
of the theory to elements of a model of the theory.
The situation is dierent for physical theories
whose domains are specic types of physical systems
or are part of the physical universe. In this case,
depending on the physical systems described by the
theory, there may be representations or Go¨del maps
of the expressions of the theory language as states
of physical systems that are described by the theory.
However there are also in general other Go¨del maps
of the language expressions to states of physical sys-
tems not in the domain of the theory.
An example of this would be a physical theory de-
scribing the dynamics of ink molecules as particles
with many closely spaced internal states of excita-
tion, moving on a two dimensional space lattice of
potential wells. The dynamics would be described
by a specic model Hamiltonian. As is seen in the
Appendix, there exist Go¨del maps of formulas and
sequences of formulas in the language of the theory
to states of ink molecules on the lattice.
However there also exist other Go¨del maps of the
formulas to states of other physical systems not de-
scribed by the theory. An example would be maps
of the language symbols onto spin projection eigen-
states of systems also on a two dimensional space
lattice where the systems and their dynamics are not
described by the theory in question. In this case the
physics of these systems would be described by an-
other theory having dierent axioms than the theory
of ink molecules.
This option is not available for a coherent the-
ory that is universally applicable. In this case all
Go¨del maps as physical representations of properties
of the language of the theory to states of physical
systems are in the domain of the theory. For any
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such map there must be formulas of the language ex-
pressing properties of physical systems that can be in-
terpreted by anyone knowing the map as statements
about properties of the formulas and of the theory
itself.
This condition that all Go¨del maps or physical
representations are necessarily in the theory domain
might be expected to have some powerful conse-
quences for a coherent theory of mathematics and
physics that is universally applicable. This is espe-
cially the case if the theory satises the maximal va-
lidity and completeness requirement. That is it max-
imally describes its own validity and completeness
and is maximally valid and complete. What these
consequences are, if any, are not known at present.
5 Discussion
At this point it is not known how to construct a co-
herent theory of mathematics and physics. However
the material presented here may help in that it should
be regarded as a general framework for constructing
such a theory. The details and many aspects of a co-
herent theory remain to be worked out. Also some or
many of the points and aspects described may need
modication. However some of the points are ex-
pected to remain.
First and foremost among the remaining points is
the requirement that the coherent theory maximally
describe its own validity and completeness and that it
be maximally valid and complete. This requirement
is expected to greatly restrict the range of allowed
theories. It may even be so restrictive that just one
theory satises it.
The requirement also has the advantage that it
automatically ensures that any theory satisfying it
agrees with experiment. This follows from the de-
nition of validity, that any physical property that is
predictable by the theory and is testable by exper-
iment, is true. Maximal completeness ensures that
the theory is maximally universally applicable as far
as its predictive power is concerned. In other words
the predictive power of the theory must be as strong
or powerful as is possible.
This raises the problem that if the requirement that
the theory agree with experiment is built into the
structure of the theory itself, then one might think
that the theory is not falsiable or even testable. This
is not the case. Even if the maximal validity and com-
pleteness requirement is built into the theory it still
must be tested. In particular the theory may be in-
terpreted to state, by complicated expressions, that it
satises the requirement. This would include a state-
ment of maximal agreement with experiment. But it
this in fact the case? Is the theory statement of this
true or false? One still has to carry out experiments
to nd out.
One should also keep separate the requirement that
the theory maximally agree with experiment from
what the actual results are of carrying out the ex-
periments. For instance, incorporation of the maxi-
mal validity and completeness requirement into the
theory may mean that the theory describe the exis-
tence of a map between a set of theoretical predictions
and a set of experimental procedures, which are both
described by the theory. The theory would also de-
scribe general properties of the map that correspond
to agreement between theory and experiment.
However existence and general description of such a
map in a coherent theory does not mean that a coher-
ent theory is any dierent than present day physics
regarding the need to carry out experiments to test
the validity of theoretical predictions and determine
detailed properties of the map. A coherent theory
that satises the maximal validity and completeness
requirement may deepen the understanding between
physics and mathematics, and may even suggest new
experiments, but it should not change the status or
need to carry out experiments.
It also may be the case that the most basic aspects
of the physical universe are a direct consequence of
the basic requirement that there exist a coherent the-
ory that maximally describes its own validity and
completeness and is maximally valid and complete.
Included are the reasons why space-time is 3 + 1
dimensional, why quantum mechanics is the correct
physical theory, and predictions of the existence and
strengths of the four basic forces. However other as-
pects of the universe, which are also predictable by
the theory, are not in this category and are subject to
experimental test. This includes essentially all of the
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experimental and theoretical work done in physics.
There are also other possibilities to consider. For
instance it may be the case that there is no single co-
herent theory. Instead there may be a nonterminat-
ing sequence of coherent theories, with each theory
more inclusive than those preceding it. If this is the
case then the n + 1st theory may include in its do-
main the requirement that the preceding n theories
all maximally agree with experiment. But there may
be other theoretical predictions in the n + 1st theory
that are not present in the rst n theories whose ex-
perimental status is outside the domain of the n+1st
theory.
This is one reason why the caveat of maximal is
present. Each theory in the sequence would describe
its own validity and completeness to the maximum
extent possible and would be valid and complete (this
includes agreeing with experiment) to the maximum
extent possible. But the amount of maximality, if
such a concept is meaningful, would be dierent for
the dierent theories.
The possibility of a nonterminating sequence of
theories is similar to the situation in the proof of
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem [1, 43]. There
it is proved that, in any theory strong enough to
express its own consistency, the formula expressing
the consistency of the theory is not a theorem of the
theory. Also the theory can be extended to a more
comprehensive theory in which the consistency of the
original theory can be proved. But then the formula
expressing the consistency of the extended theory is
not a theorem of the extended theory.
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A Appendix
Many physical representations are possible for the
symbols and expressions of a language. Here a repre-
sentation will be described that is based on the pres-
ence or absence of systems in small potential wells
located on a two dimensional lattice of points on a
solid state matrix. The description here will be quite
simple and will be limited to the representation only.
No dynamics corresponding to the generation of se-
quences of expressions, such as those that correspond
to proofs, will be discussed.
A physical representation considered here is a
model for text on printed pages in that the systems
in the potential wells are ink molecules. Each sym-
bol corresponds to a specic pattern of occupied wells
surrounded by unoccupied wells. Expressions corre-
spond to paths of symbols on the lattice. A solid
state matrix with all potential wells unoccupied cor-
responds to a blank page. Locations of the wells on
the page are given by X, Y coordinates x, y. Multiple
pages can be considered by extending the lattice into
three dimensions where X − Y planes for dierent
values of Z correspond to dierent pages.
Each potential well may or may not be occupied
by ink molecules. Here an ink molecule is a complex
system with many closely spaced internal states of
excitation. The molecules are easily excited by ab-
sorption of ambient light of all visible wavelengths,
and the excited states quickly decay by emitting cas-
cades of infrared photons as heat or by transfer of
phonons to the solid state matrix.
The state of an ink molecule in the ground state of
the potential well at x, y in thermal equilibrium with






jE, 0ix,yh0, Ej. (1)
Here jE, 0ix,y denotes the ink molecule in a state with
excitation energy E and in the ground state of the
well located at lattice site x, y. Z is the partition
function that normalizes the state. It is also assumed
that the combination of the shape and height of each
potential well and separation of the lattice points are
such that the states jE, 0ix,y and jE, 0ix′,y′ are es-
sentially orthogonal whenever x 6= x0 or y 6= y0.
To keep things simple the assumption is made that
the energy spacing of the potential well states is large
compared to kT where k is Boltzman’s constant.
Based on this Eq. 1 is a good approximation to the
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state of the ink molecule in a well at x, y as the proba-
bility of being in a state above the ground state of the
well is very small. It is also assumed that the internal
excitation state of an ink molecule is essentially inde-
pendent of whether the environment is visibly dark
or well illuminated with visible light, provided only
that both environments are at the same temperature.
The environmental bath also plays an important
role in stabilizing the position states of the individ-
ual ink molecules to eigenstates of the individual po-










x′,y′ jE, 0ix,yh0, Ejx′,y′
would immediately decohere and stabilize [66, 67] to
the diagonal form
∑
x,y jcx,yj2ρx,y with ρx,y given by
Eq. 1.
Let α be an arbitrary nite set of points on a lat-
tice. The quantum state corresponding to one ink
molecule in each well at all locations in α and all












jEx,y, 0ix,yh0, Ex,yj. (2)
Here symbols of a language correspond to sets of
dierent patterns of closely spaced occupied wells.
To this end let αS be the set of occupied locations
corresponding to the symbol S. A potentially useful
characterization of the set αS is in terms of a location
x, y that serves as a standard ducial mark or loca-
tion parameter for the symbol, and a set b of scaling
and other parameters needed to uniquely character-
ize the symbol S. Using this notation, which replaces





Some examples will serve to clarify this. The
straight vertical line extending for n lattice sites in
the Y direction from x, y to x, y + n− 1 corresponds
to the symbol "j" located at x, y. The point x, y
locating one end of the symbol serves as a ducial lo-
cation convention for this symbol. For each x, y the
physical state of "j" is given by ρjx,y,n = ⊗x+n−1x′=x ρx′,y
Other examples are the symbol "/", a diagonal line
of length n whose state is ρ/x,y,n = ρα with α =
fx, y; x+1, y+1;    ; x+n−1, y+n−1g, and the ">"
symbol with horizontal arm of length 2m+1 and state
description ρ>x,y,n,m = ρα where α = fx, y;    ; x, y+
n − 1; x − m, y + n − 1;    ; x + m, y + n − 1g. The
values of n, m serve as scale factors for the symbols.
For example if ">" is described by n, m, then ">",
which is the same symbol but is twice as large, would
be described by 2n, 2m.
These examples and Eq. 3 show the physical state
representation for any printed symbol in a language
for the printing model used here. However languages
are composed of ordered sets or strings of symbols,
as words. In many cases the language expressions
may be further organized into strings of words. The
printed text of this paper is an example of a long
string of words.
For the representation considered here each word
W corresponds to an unordered set αW of occupied
locations that corresponds to a set of disconnected
sets αS for each symbol S in W and an ordering of
the symbol sets. The (unoccupied) spacing between
the sets αS should be larger that the spacing, if any
between the individual ink molecule locations within
each αS . For reasons which will become clear soon,
the ordering of the symbols S in W is separated from
which symbols are in W. Note that the same symbol
can appear more than once in a word.
Let BW be the unordered set of symbols S in the
word W . The state ρBW is given by ρBW = ⊗SW ραS
with ραS given by Eq. 2 with αS replacing α. in






with ρS,xS ,yS ,bS given by Eq. 3. The product is over
all symbols S in the set BW of symbols in W at du-
cial locations xS , yS and scale factors bS . Also x, y, b
denote functions from the symbols in BW to x and y
lattice positions and to a set of scale factors for the
symbols.
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Since the lattice locations xS , yS of the symbols in
ρBW ,x,y,b are arbitrary, it is clear that this state does
not represent a word state. In order for this state
to represent a word W , the lattice locations of the
symbols must be ordered according to the rule by
which the word is read.
For many languages, texts are often organized into
lines of symbols in one space direction with successive
lines ordered in an orthogonal direction. Successive
pages are then ordered in the third space direction.
Here spatial distances between symbols, lines, and
pages are used for the ordering. A specic example
of this has symbols in a line of text on a page with
locations corresponding to dierent values of x and
a xed value of y. The symbols in the line are or-
dered according to their positions in the X direction.
Lines are ordered according to their positions in the
Y direction. Then if the values of xS , yS in the deni-
tion of ρBW are such that the yS values are all equal
(y
S
= y for all S) then the state ρBW ,x,y,b can be iden-
tied as a state for a word W , or ρBW ,x,y,b = ρW,x,y,b
where the letters in W are ordered according to the
ordering of their x positions.
For example let BW consist of the letters fl, a, h, tg.
If the state ρBW is such that the y values for the four
symbols are equal and xh < xa < xl < xt then by
Eq. 4 ρBW ,x,y,b is the state for the word "halt" or
ρBW ,x,y,b = ρhalt,x,y,b.
The point of this rather pedantic exercise is to em-
phasize that, in this model, multisymbol states de-
pend on the locations of the component symbols and
on the scaling or size of each symbol. In addition
the organization of these states into word states de-
pends on the rules used to read the words. These
rules are given by the dynamics of the reading pro-
cess. In addition the dynamics of this process are
not completely arbitrary. They are subject to the re-
quirement of ecient physical implementation. This
requirement, which was discussed elsewhere in the
context of representing numbers by states in quan-
tum mechanics [57, 58, 46], means that there must
be a physical process which can read the text and
that the space time and thermodynamic resources ex-
pended to implement the reading must be minimized.
In particular the resources expended must not be ex-
ponential in the number of symbols read.
It is worth discussing this in a bit more detail. Con-
sider for example symbols scattered about on an in-
nite X − Y lattice in some state ρBW . Any reading
rule in which the determination of the location for
reading the n + 1st symbol is based on what the rst
n symbols were requires an exponential amount of
resources. This is based on the observation that if
there are m symbols in the language, then for each n
the rule must distinguish among mn alternatives to
make the determination.
Reading rules in use do not have this property in
that determination of the location of the n+1st sym-
bol from the value of n does not depend on the state
of the rst n symbols. As such the rules are ecient
in that the resources expended are polynomial in the
number of symbols read. Since the requirement of
polynomial eciency is quite weak, there are many
rules that satisfy this condition, so one would want to
pick rules that more or less minimize the free energy
resources expended. For example a rule in which the
resources expended are independent of the number of
symbols read (the polynomial exponent is 0) is quite
ecient. The rule described for reading this text in
English on the printed journal page is an example in
that the resources expended to read the nth symbol
are independent of n (except for carriage return loca-
tions). Other rules with the same or similar eciency
are possible, and some are in use.
The model described is clearly robust in the sense
that reading the text does not change the individ-
ual symbol states or move them about on the lat-
tice. Physically this is a consequence of the fact
that photons in the visible light range excite the ink
molecules to internal excited states. The potential
wells and interactions with the component atoms in
the molecules are such that the amplitudes for excit-
ing an ink molecule to an excited well state, or to
move it from one lattice location to another, are very
small. It follows from this that suciently many re-
peated readings can move ink molecules around and
make signicant changes in the quantum state of the
text.
Models that are much more sensitive to the reading
interactions and other environmental influences can
also be described. Examples would be spin models
with spin systems replacing the ink molecules on the
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lattice. The projections of the spins along some direc-
tion such as that provided by a magnetic eld would
correspond to the dierent symbol states. Thus if the
language contained m symbols, the spin S of each of
the systems must be such that 2S + 1  m. The
ordering of the symbol states of many systems into
words and word sequences would depend on a path
chosen on the lattice.
This model will not be pursued further here. Suf-
ce it to say it is similar in some aspects to models
of quantum NMR computing [68, 69, 70] which have
been studied.
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